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However, vocational education has a long history of stigmati-
zation—stereotyped and devalued as education that is desired by 
and more suitable for children of the working classes. As a result, in 
Britain, it has always approximated Dewey’s “narrow technical 
trade education for specialised callings, carried on under the 
control of others” (1916/2001, p. 325), a form of apprenticeship 
rather than education. Unsurprisingly, attempts to upgrade 
vocational education have failed because the British middle classes 
have never countenanced it as appropriate education for their own 
children (Tomlinson, 2005). Despite a great deal of rhetoric about 
high-status vocational routes, policies have always been directed at 
the lower, and indeed lowest, achieving young people (Wolf, 2002). 
Any sort of parity between vocational and academic education 
would require a transformation in both what vocational education 
constitutes and who engages in it. While Nel Noddings is 
There is a danger that vocational education will be interpreted in 
theory and practice as trade education: as a means of securing 
technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits. Education would 
then become an instrument of perpetuating unchanged the existing 
industrial order of society, instead of operating as a means of its 
transformation. The desired transformation is not difficult to define in 
a formal way. It signifies a society in which every person shall be 
occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth 
living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons 
together more perceptible—which breaks down the barriers of distance 
between them. (Dewey, 1916/2001, p. 325) 
Dewey’s vision for democratic vocational education has never been realized, although, as Nel Noddings’s article (2011) makes clear, there is a 
pressing need to revisit the arguments for and against vocational 
tracks in schooling. Her thoughtful, reflexive, and at times provoca-
tive piece raises fascinating and timely issues about both the nature 
and the place of vocational education, and more broadly about what 
constitutes democratic education. In the United Kingdom, as well as 
in the United States, concerns are currently being raised about the 
appropriateness of an academic education for all children and the 
need for vocational training for those who are seen to require more 
practical learning (Hurst, 2011, p. 1).
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suggesting a very different version of what has traditionally been 
seen to comprise vocational education, I am less sure how her new 
schooling for democracy would result in a socially diverse group of 
students undertaking vocational education.
Where I do concur with Noddings, and Mortimer Adler, 
whom she quotes, is that the same schooling for all translates into 
inequality and injustice. Throughout my academic career, I have 
taught teacher-training courses and a regular refrain, particularly 
from new teachers, is, “I treat all the children the same,” as if the 
recognition of difference is in some way discriminatory. However, 
the recognition of difference that I encourage teachers to focus on, 
and then work to address, is not that of perceived differences of 
ability and aptitude but rather of children’s very unequal and unfair 
educational starting points.
Recently, the UK education secretary, Michael Gove, told a 
Conservative Party Conference that “rich, thick kids do better 
educationally than poor, clever children before they even get to 
school.” He went on to assert that “unfortunately, despite the best 
efforts of our society, the situation is getting worse” (2010). Over 
the course of schooling, these privileged middle-class children 
consolidate and even increase their educational advantage over 
their less advantaged peers (Lareau, 2003). One consequence is 
that the expansion of university education across the globe over the 
last twenty years has mainly advantaged the middle classes. 
Middle-class young people, whose dispositions and inclinations 
would not normally lead them into a university education, are 
disproportionately taking up the additional places, rather than 
Gove’s “poor clever children.” This raises troubling questions about 
selectivity and different academic routes. We are not talking here of 
natural inclinations and intrinsic academic dispositions but rather 
the manufacture of academic advantage through the, often 
privately funded, inculcation of academic skills and competencies. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, private schools are almost 
entirely focused on high academic attainment—they are educa-
tional powerhouses for churning out as many As and A-stars at A 
level as possible, and with 23% of the money spent on schooling 
going to the 7% of the school population who attend private 
schools (Sibieta, Chowdry, & Muriel, 2008), they produce students 
who are well placed to monopolize places in our top universities.
The fact that Michael Gove highlighted, that children come to 
school with very different levels of cultural and economic 
resources, does result in differential treatment but not treatment 
that can in any way be seen to resemble schooling for democracy. 
Often material and cultural disadvantages are taken to be cotermi-
nous with lack of academic potential, while their converse, 
material and cultural privileges, are seen to indicate intrinsic 
academic ability. It is the middle and the upper classes who are 
perceived to have the intellectual potential. Noddings quotes 
Charles Eliot’s assertion that “there is no such thing among men as 
equality of nature, of capacity for training, or of intellectual power” 
(Eliot, 1908, p. 13). But what Eliot’s words gloss over is the extent to 
which intellectual power, because of the far greater cultural and 
economic assets of the privileged in society, is culturally and 
educationally accumulated in the middle and upper classes, not 
because they are naturally more intelligent but because they have 
more resources to enable that accumulation.
Against such an inequitable wider social context, differential 
treatment on the basis of perceived ability can easily become a 
form of what Bourdieu and Passeron call “class racism” (1979), the 
process by which the middle class’s socially determined taste for 
legitimate culture is passed off as a marker of inherent moral and 
intellectual superiority, and by extension, the working class’s 
inherent inferiority. But as a sociologist, I know intelligence is a 
social construction. Lareau (2003) brilliantly brought this to life in 
her study of the concerted cultivation of children’s academic 
success in American middle-class homes. I believe it is only when 
we address this glaring inequality, which is too often taken as an 
unchangeable given, that tracking in the form of vocational and 
academic streams becomes a good idea. Without a prior change in 
what has become a British, as well as an American, mind-set, the 
vocational will continue to be what the poor, the minorities, and 
the working class do, while the middle and upper classes continue 
their monopoly of the best of the academic. Dewey was concerned 
that in the absence of “a truly democratic society,” vocational 
courses would fail to be “liberative of imagination or thinking 
power” (1916/2001, p. 266). We need to reach a situation that we are 
still very far from, where tracks can be chosen on the basis of 
interests and inclinations, not social class and perceived academic 
ability. Then, ideally both vocational and academic courses will be 
mixed in terms of social class and ethnicity.
Part of the problem is that educational systems are only as 
good as the societies they emerge out of. Capitalist, neoliberal 
societies beget capitalist neoliberal educational systems. As 
Noddings thoughtfully points out, the road forward is rarely 
behind us. Basil Bernstein (1970) asserted that “education cannot 
compensate for society,” but schools that aspire to be “incubators of 
democracy” have a moral duty to try. A key issue is what type of 
democracy we are aiming for. Democracy in the 21st-century 
United States and United Kingdom is a pale shadow of what it 
could be, especially for and from the perspective of large swathes of 
the population—in particular, the young, the disenfranchised, and 
the despondent.
Most current understanding of democracy promotes formal 
equality in the image of an educational level playing field. However, 
this is the equivalent of flattening the field of bumps before a small 
neighborhood team takes on a professional one. As Bourdieu 
pointed out: “The formal equity that governs the entire educational 
system is actually unjust, and, in any society that proclaims 
democratic ideals, it protects privileges all the better than would 
their open and obvious transmission” (2008, p. 36). There is little 
surprise then that in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, social mobility has ground to a halt (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2009; OECD, 
2010).
In order to find a strong and socially just understanding of 
democracy, I have gone back to R. H. Tawney, the political philoso-
pher of the 1930s and 1940s whom I studied over 40 years ago as an 
undergraduate. For Tawney, schooling for democracy required not 
only a common school but also a common university:
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There ought to be a system of higher education which aims at, even 
though it cannot attain, universal provision, which is accessible to all 
who care to use it, and which is maintained not in order to enable 
intellect to climb from one position to another, but to enable all to 
develop the faculties which, because they are the attributes of man 
[sic], are not the attributes of any particular class or profession of man. 
(1964, p. 77)
As Tawney asserted, no class is good enough to do its thinking for 
another. To guard against an upper-class practice that has since 
become pervasive in the United Kingdom, Tawney argued for a 
broadening of the conception of a university “to admit as genuine 
university students those who are not studying for the purpose of 
any profession except that of a reasonable and humane conduct of 
life” (1964, pp. 83–4). An influx of people who are at universities 
because they actually want to learn can only be an improvement on 
a contemporary status quo where—like Nel Noddings’s angry 
young man, who saw only one reason for going to college, that of 
making more money—many current students see graduating from 
college primarily as a means to a good job.
Like Noddings, I dispute the valuing of the academic over the 
vocational. There is nothing inherently good or true about intellec-
tual inquiry. In fact, a great deal of intellectual inquiry in the area of 
education has been compromised, complicit with an inequitable 
status quo it should be challenging. The academy, both in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom, is increasingly about 
economic and political ends rather than educational means, and 
that is the result, in part, of an academic culture that too often lacks 
intellectual courage and integrity to challenge imposing agendas 
that have little to do with schooling for democracy. Both countries 
have signally failed in creating the educational system Dewey 
envisaged would result in “a society in which every person shall be 
occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth 
living . . . and breaks down the barriers of distance between them” 
(1916/2001, p. 325).
As Noddings points out, current university policies and 
practices are deeply problematic, in the United Kingdom as well as 
in the United States. I have now taught for a long period at elite 
universities, and my experience has taught me that we need to be 
aware of the limitations of intellectual pathways, particularly when 
they result in homogeneous groups of students learning together. 
And too often they do result in the development of critical learning 
skills in the narrowest sense of the term, accompanied by a lack of 
social awareness and ignorance of the lives of others. We only have 
to reflect on the political and financial crises that have beset many 
Western countries in the 21st century to understand the conse-
quences of the lack of the social and political intelligence that we all 
need in order to contribute to the common good and the making of 
the good society.
But widening, or even maintaining, current levels of access 
to what, in both countries, are polarized systems, is not the 
answer; steeply hierarchical higher education sectors are no way 
to democratize education. Working-class and minority students 
are clustered in those universities at the bottom of the rankings. 
In the United Kingdom, the decade of the 2000s may appear to be 
a success story in the attempts to widen access to college for 
working-class students, but that access has overwhelmingly been 
to new universities. And just as many comprehensive schools in 
the United Kingdom were demonized as “bog-standard” for 
having large cohorts of working-class students, so have these new 
universities. The “massification” of the higher education sector 
(Trow, 2006) has resulted in the reproduction of the UK school 
system’s highly polarized and segregated hierarchy, with those 
new universities with sizable cohorts of working class students 
languishing at the bottom of the rankings, while the elite universi-
ties, with equally sizeable numbers of privately educated students, 
are perched at the pinnacle.
In neither country is there much evidence of Dewey’s “fellow-
ship” or Tawney’s “learning from others” across social class lines. 
Rather, less advantaged and poor students become educational 
“outcasts on the inside” (Bourdieu, 2008), just as they have been for 
decades in the two countries’ schooling systems. Credential 
inflation has meant many of those working-class young people, 
who 20 years ago felt they needed to stay in school through their 
teenage years, now feel that a university education is essential if 
they are to get a good job. US President Barack Obama claimed in 
2010 that “education is the economic issue of our time,” and my 
concern is that any prioritizing of the vocational over the academic 
that is not part of a much wider social justice agenda will become 
yet another way of economizing education.
Rather than accepting the current common-sense belief in 
intrinsic class differences of vocational versus academic disposi-
tions, I want an intervention more in keeping with Bourdieu and 
Passeron’s rational pedagogy (1979) where, instead of postulating 
the formal equality of students, policies and practices take into 
account cultural inequalities between students. This, they assert, 
focuses on making the transmission of knowledge more successful 
and thereby truly democratizes education. For them, such a 
pedagogy has yet to be invented and is not to be confused with 
existing ones, which, having only psychological foundations, 
underpin and serve an educational system that fails to recognize 
social differences.
A revalorizing of vocational and working-class knowledge and 
a broadening out of what constitutes educational success beyond 
the narrowly academic are long overdue.
But that requires far more than the reestablishment of separate 
vocational and academic tracks. It needs a revaluing and respect for 
what those in the working class have traditionally done alongside a 
recognition of their potential to do very different things, if provided 
with adequate support. This is what Noddings is advocating when 
she evokes a Whitmanesque vision of democracy, but we don’t gain 
a sense of how this change in hearts and minds might be encour-
aged, let alone achieved.
I have written recently (Reay, 2011) of what a socially just 
education system looks like. I argued that in Finland, having an 
educational system in which virtually all children enroll in 
identical comprehensive schools, regardless of class background 
or personal abilities and characteristics, has resulted in schools 
and classrooms that are heterogeneous in terms of pupil differ-
ences and diverse in terms of educational needs and expectations 
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(Valljarvi, 2003). Yet, at the same time, schools are very similar 
in pupil profile to each other. The difference between schools is 
minuscule compared to those in countries like the United 
Kingdom and the United States. For example, in 2006 Finland 
had a tenth of the between-school variance found in the United 
Kingdom. It is this parity of value and esteem across schools that 
has led to a culture of educational inclusivity that is absent in the 
increasingly hierarchical and segregated systems in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. And that is the ethical conun-
drum—a highly individualized, strongly neoliberal country like 
either the United Kingdom or the United States would not be 
able to set up separate vocational and academic tracks, like a 
number of European countries have established, with reason-
ably similar parity of esteem. Rather, as in the past, immediately 
a hierarchy of worth would be established. A major problem in 
the United Kingdom has been that all the activities and prac-
tices associated with the working classes have automatically 
been assigned a lower value and deemed to be inferior (Skeggs, 
2004). This, as I touched on earlier, is a question of hearts and 
minds as much as it is pedagogy and educational policy. As I 
have argued elsewhere (Reay, 2005), in the United Kingdom 
class seeps into every soul, creating divisions between people 
that are not nearly as pronounced in the Finnish context. That is 
why the Finns have managed to create an educational system 
where the commonalities among students are emphasized and 
the differences downplayed.
To achieve schooling for democracy, in the sense of creating a 
system where differences become relatively unimportant because 
there are not enormous inequalities between people and where the 
emphasis is on what students share, would be a massive— many 
would say impossible—undertaking in the UK context. It is not 
merely a question of totally rethinking and overhauling the 
educational system but more important, of changing the national 
psyche. And despite all the differences among British, and I would 
add Americans, what we appear to share across class, gender, and 
ethnicity is a deeply troubling propensity to tolerate intolerable 
levels of economic inequalities and the educational injustices they 
give rise to. In contrast, schooling for genuine democracy recog-
nizes and addresses cultural and social inequalities among students 
and takes a central role in creating “a society permeated by mutual 
regard of all citizens for all other citizens” (Dewey, 1916/2001, p. 311). 
We are miles away from this. But, even more concerning, we are 
not even venturing along the road.
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